Climate shocks are increasingly recognised as a threat to structural transformation in developing economies, yet their consequences for manufacturing as opposed to agriculture remain little understood.
Another El Niño is on the way. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) predicts an 80% likelihood of an El Niño event developing between June and August, with a near or above 90% chance of it persisting until November. The last episode of comparable severity, in 2015–16, was among the most damaging climate events to affect the Horn of Africa in decades, failing two consecutive rainy seasons and leaving more than ten million people in need of emergency food assistance.
When drought arrives, attention rightly turns to farmers, herders, and rural households. But the damage does not stop at the farm gate. Our research on the 2015–16 episode shows that the drought reached deep into Ethiopia’s factories, and that the firms hit hardest were precisely those that turn the country’s harvests into food and drink. This is a side of climate risk that policy has largely overlooked, and it deserves a place on the table well before the next rains fail.
The hidden cost of drought
Ethiopia’s food and beverage manufacturers are no minor corner of the economy. They make up roughly a quarter of the country’s medium- and large-scale manufacturing firms, employ around a fifth of its manufacturing workforce, and generate close to four in every ten birr of manufacturing sales. They are also tightly bound to domestic agriculture, buying more than two-thirds of their raw materials — wheat, barley, maize, sugarcane, milk, livestock — from local producers. That dependence is a strength in good years and a liability in bad ones. When the fields dry up, so does the supply line that keeps the mills, bakeries, dairies, and breweries running.
We find that food and beverage firms in drought-affected districts saw their sales fall by around 39% relative to comparable firms elsewhere, and their productivity by roughly a quarter. The event study shows that these were not passing setbacks. The losses were modest in the first year, as firms drew down whatever stocks they held, then deepened steadily through 2017 and 2018 — long after the rains had returned. A drought that lasts one season, in other words, can scar industrial supply chains for years. One of the main reason all of this happens traces back to raw materials channels. Treated firms could not get enough of the local inputs they depend on, and they could not import their way out of the shortfall. In our survey of firms that lived through the drought, nearly two-thirds named raw material shortages as a serious disruption, and almost half called it their single biggest operational problem.
Who pays the price?
The drought’s burden inside firms fell unevenly. Rather than laying workers off, firms mostly cut wages and they cut them for some workers and not others. The pay of unskilled production workers dropped by around a quarter, while skilled administrative staff were left largely untouched. When revenues fall, firms trim costs where workers have the least bargaining power and the easiest replacements. Unskilled workers, competing with a flooded rural labour market, absorbed the shock while skilled workers, harder and costlier to replace, were shielded. Climate shocks, then, do not only shrink the economic pie but they can quietly widen inequality within the workplace.
What governments and firms can do?
The central lesson is that climate resilience cannot be treated as an agricultural concern alone. In an economy where industry is built on the back of domestic farming, protecting the harvest and protecting the factory are two sides of the same task. That reframing carries practical implications.
The first is to build resilience into agro-processing supply chains before the shock, not after. Investment in irrigation and water management steadies the agricultural base that feeds industry; better rural roads and storage allow firms to source from unaffected regions and to hold buffers when supplies tighten; and support for drought-resistant crops. The single most requested measure among the firms we surveyed was strengthens the input base on which the whole sector rests. These are agricultural investments with an industrial payoff.
The second is to keep firms solvent through the shock. Because the damage deepens with a lag, the firms still standing a year into a drought are often those quietly running down their reserves. Access to credit during and after climate shocks, alongside contingency financing and targeted tax relief for resilience investments, can keep viable firms from tipping into closure and our evidence suggests the true cost of these droughts is understated precisely because the worst-hit firms disappear from view.
The third is to protect the workers who bear the heaviest load. Since the adjustment falls on unskilled production workers through lower pay, blanket support for firms is not enough. Measures that cushion the incomes of the most exposed workers such as public works, temporary transfers, or wage support tied to verified shocks would target relief where the burden actually lands.
None of this requires waiting for certainty about 2026. The forecast is already strong enough to act on, and the cost of preparing is small against the cost of another lost industrial year. The 2015–16 El Niño taught Ethiopia, in hard data, how a drought travels from the field to the factory and on to the worker’s wage. The value of that lesson lies in using it before the next one arrives.



